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HOME RULE-Identical Tax Levied by Illinois' Home
Rule County and by Municipalities Creates No Conflict.
The Local Government Article of the 1970 Illinois constitution
grants home rule powers to Cook County and to municipalities having
populations of 25,000 or more. Other counties may eventually qualify for home rule powers under the provision and any municipality
may elect by referendum to receive such powers.1 The article also
provides that if there is a conflict between the ordinance of a municipality and the ordinance of a home rule county, the municipal
ordinance will prevail within its jurisdiction.2 The resolution of conflicts and possible conflicts under these provisions is likely to determine the relative powers of counties and municipalities, and thus the
impact of their new home rule powers.
In the past few months several Illinois supreme court decisions have
been rendered interpreting the home rule provisions of the 1970 Illinois
constitution.' Of particular importance is the case of City of Evanston v. County of Cook, which dealt with the problem of identical taxing
ordinances enacted by a home rule county and home rule municipalities.4 The decision held that there was no conflict between the ordinances within the meaning of the conflict resolution provision of the
constitution. This decision sets the tone for the future development of
the county-municipality power relation.
In order to put the decision in perspective, it is necessary to have
an understanding of the background of the concept of home rule in
general and the concept of home rule which developed in the Sixth
Illinois Constitutional Convention, specifically. The grant of home rule
powers to qualifying municipalities and counties made in the 1970 illinois constitution was an attempt to give local units of government the
tools with which to deal with local problems. It was also an attempt
to reverse the presumption about the powers inherent in local government. In the absence of such a grant, Dillon's Rule prevails:
1. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970).
2. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(c) (1970).
3. See S. Bloom, Inc. v. Korshak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972); Bridgman
v. Korzen, - Il1. 2d -, - N.E.2d - (1972); Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 111. 2d
161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972); Oak Park Federal Savings and Loan v. Village of Oak
Park, No. 45171 (I1l., January, 1973).
4. 53 Ill. 2d 312, 291 N.E.2d 823 (1972) [hereinafter cited as City of Evanston].
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It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers,
and no others: First, those granted in express words; second,
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers ex-

pressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the
declared objects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply
convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial
doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation, and the power is denied. 5
Justice Dillon emphasized the impact of this subordinate relationship of the city to the state in his opinion in an 1868 Iowa case:
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the
breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so
may it destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature may, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable of so
great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of
the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporations could
not prevent it. We know of no limitations on this right so far as
the corporations themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 6
This creature concept has caused one writer to use an infant-parent
analogy in describing the dependency of Illinois cities on action by the
state and the need for express authorization for any action to deal with
city problems under the 1870 Illinois constitution. 7 It has been
said that this creature concept may have been the natural outgrowth of
8
a rural era and a general distrust of cities.
Today the cities are faced with problems of police protection, education, transportation, housing, and pollution, to name a few. The necessity of receiving authorization from the state legislature for solution of
these problems reduces the city government's ability to respond
promptly and efficiently to the needs of its people.9 The Commission on Urban Area Government portrayed the creature concept as an
outdated one:
5. J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-50 (5th ed., 1911)
original- Footnotes omitted.)

6.

(Emphasis in

City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475

(1868).
7. B. Hodes, Municipal Home Rule and the State Constitution of Illinois, 30 Cm.
B. REc. 249, 249-50 (1949).
8. Id. at 250.
9. See Banovetz, Urban Problems, in CON CON: ISSUES FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 248, 263 (V. Ranney ed. 1970) (quoting Louis Ancel's testimony be-

fore the Commission on Urban Area Government, September 17, 1969).
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This 19th Century concept that local government exists for the
convenience of the State is an untenable position in this era of
urban crisis and is rejected by the Commission. It creates antagonism toward the Legislature among local officials and confusion
among the public as to where responsibility truly lies. Most importantly, it limits the assumption of local responsibility and discourages local creativity. 10
The counties are similarly subordinate to the state in the absence
of any provision for home rule. However, counties are generally organized by the state for the purpose of political organization and administration; and their creation is not dependent on local initiative as
But with the
is generally true of the creation of municipalities."
expansion of large urban areas to include major portions of some
counties, the county may take on more importance as a unit of government potentially capable of dealing with metropolitan problems.
One observer has noted the following:
Since two-thirds of all American metropolitan areas are conveniently located within the confines of a single county, the county
seems an appropriate starting place for effective urban government. Moreover the placement of responsibility with the county
is more likely to be achieved than is the creation of new metropolitan forms despite the increasing appearance of metropolitan
councils of government. Even where the county is but one of many
countries comprising the metropolitan area, effective intergovernmental cooperation is far more feasible among a few coundisties than with innumerable municipalities, school and special
12
tricts and authorites which interlace the metropolitan area.
THE ILLINOIS BACKGROUND

At the time of the convening of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, there were in existence over 6500 units of local government50% more than in any other state." The need to reduce the number
of governmental units operating within metropolitan areas enunciated
above was echoed by the Report of the Committee on Local Government at the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention (1970). 1" In fact,
10. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (December 8, 1969-September 3, 1970) 1609 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS] (citing
Commission on Urban Area Government, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION 2 (January, 1970)).
11.

J. WINTERS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SOLUTIONS OF METROPOL-

ITAN AREA PROBLEMS

46 (1961).

12. Glauberman, County Home Rule: An Urban Necessity, 1 URB. LAw. 170, 17071 (1969).
13. 4 PROCEEDINGS 3024 (Delegate John C. Parkhurst, Chairman, Committee on
Local Government).
14. 7 PROCEEDINGS 1592.
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the proposal of the committee included a preamble which mentioned
the goal of deterring the proliferation of units of local government, reducing the present number of units, minimizing duplication and overlapping of taxing jurisdictions, and promoting intergovernmental cooperation. 5 The failure of this committee proposal to be adopted in
the draft of the constitution submitted by the convention to the citizens
was attributable to the desire to eliminate preambles to each section
of the constitution rather than to adverse sentiment of the convention. 16
The Committee on Local Government of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention (hereinafter referred to as the Local Government
Committee or the Committee) felt that counties as well as municipalities should receive home rule, noting that fifteen states had already
given home rule to counties.' 7 The Committee noted that with increasing urbanization, counties had become suitable natural units of
government for coordination of services within their boundaries
in both incorporated and unincorporated areas in addition to their original function as administrative units of state government.'"
The
Committee also saw the strengthening of county government in metropolitan areas as a way of eliminating duplication and overlapping of
local units of government.' 9
Many individuals and groups went on record before the Local Government Committee as favoring home rule.2 ° One group also offered
criticism. 2 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
suggested that some units given home rule powers may be too small to
be able to handle local problems, that economies of scale may be overlooked in the effort of each unit to solve its own problems, and that
home rule units may ignore the effects of the exercise of their enlarged powers on neighboring units. 22 An individual also went on
record as a critic of home rule to some extent.2" Professor James M.
Banovetz asserted that there was no evidence that home rule states
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.

4 PROCEEDINGS 3032-38.
7 PROCEEDINGS 1631.
7 PROCEEDINGS 1631-32.

Id.

20. Among them were Richard J. Daley, Mayor of Chicago; the League of Women
Voters; the Illinois Municipal League; the Chamber of Commerce of the United States;

the Commission on Urban Area Government, formed pursuant to an Illinois Executive
Order; and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, a federal group,
7 PROCEEmNGS 1607-11.
21. 7 PROCEEDINGS 1611-12.

22.
23.

Id.
7 PRocaniNs 1613-14.
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have made more progress toward solution of urban problems than
other states. He also pointed out that an adequate tax base and broad
revenue powers are crucial to the effectiveness of home rule.24
The need for local autonomy was expressed by Delegate John G.
Woods, member of the Local Government Committee, in the debates
of the constitutional convention as the need to handle locally such
problems as curbing the illicit sale of "goof balls" to minors and the
licensing of building contractors and plumbers in order to ensure the
quality of construction. The then existing structure of power required action by the General Assembly in the nature of general legislation-not referring to any one municipality by name, but granting
the power to all municipalities of the same population class-to allow
a municipality to take such action. Delegate Woods suggested that
home rule power to take such action independently would free the
General Assembly from handling minor bills on matters of specific
rather than general concern.2
Delegate Woods went on to mention how Illinois' grant of home
rule would differ from that of other states. It would be a broad grant
of power supplemented by the specific enumeration of some powers considered particularly crucial to the success of the home rule concept in order to prevent the erosion of home rule power which had occurred elsewhere.2 6 Article VII, Section 6(a) of the 1970 Illinois
constitution now provides that,
Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise
any power and perform any function pertaining to its government
and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for
the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to
license; to tax; and to incur debt.
Another unique feature of the 1970 Illinois constitution as proposed and adopted which was noted by Delegate Woods was the recognition of concurrent exercise of power by the state and home rule
units. 7 Article VII, Section 6(i) provides as follows:
Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the
State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that
the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be
exclusive.
24.

Id.

25.

4

26.
27.

Id.
Id.

PROCEEDINGS

3039.
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Ohio has followed a scheme of judicial preemption by interpreting
the exercise of a power by the state as occupation of the field, thus prohibiting home rule units from exercising concurrent power.2 8 The inclusion of Section 6(m) in Article VII also serves to discourage judicial construction which would limit home rule powers: "Powers and
functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally."
Further illustrating the impact of the Illinois concept of home rule
are the facts that (1) the Illinois grant of home rule is made directly
to the units of local government; (2) the Illinois provision requires no
home rule charter to be enacted; and (3) the exercise of home rule
power under the Illinois plan is optional.29
Since the grant is made directly to the units of local government
rather than being dependent on the enactment of enabling legislation
by the General Assembly, the grant is immediately effective and not
subject to the imposition of conditions by the legislature except as permitted by the Local Government Article of the constitution. The absence of a requirement of a home rule charter as a condition precedent
to home rule status also has the effect of making the grant of power immediately effective: referendum approval necessitated by enactment
of a charter can result in delay or frustration of the acquisition of home
rule powers. The optional nature of the home rule power results
from the fact that units automatically granted home rule status need
not exercise their powers, and units not included under the automatic
grant may elect to obtain the status. The immediacy and flexibility
of powers provided by the form of grant enhance self-determination at
the local government level.
TAXING POWER OF HOME RULE UNITS

The taxation power of home rule units is of particular importance in
the overall scheme, since without revenue, the right to "exercise any
power and perform any function pertaining to" the government and affairs of the unit has a hollow ring. 3° As the Committee stated in its
report, "in the simplest terms, urban areas need more money if they are
to survive and grow."' 3 1 It was felt that, because the power to tax is
so essential to meaningful home rule, it should be mentioned specifically in the grant of powers to prevent the courts from excluding the
28.
29.
VII, §

30.
31.

484

Brief for Appellants at 29-32, City of Evanston.
7 PROCEEDINGS 1616-19, 1628-37, sections corresponding to ILL.
6(a), 6(b) (1970).
ILL. CONST. art.
7 PROCEEDINGS

VII, § 6(a) (1970).
1625.

CONST. art.
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power by narrow construction. 2 It is the taxation power, of home
rule counties which was at stake in the City of Evanston case to be discussed in this article.
The sections of the Local Government Article of the 1970 Illinois
constitution which are primarily relevant to the discussion of the power
of taxation are Sections 6(a), 6(e)(2), 6(g), 6(h), 6(i), and 6(1).
The relevant portion of Section 6(a) is set forth above. It grants the
taxing power to home rule units subject to limitation only as provided in Article VII, Section 6.
The first limitation is set out in Section 6(e) (2): "A home rule
unit shall have only the power that the General Assembly may provide
by law . . . (2) to license for revenue or impose taxes upon or mea-

sured by income or earnings or upon occupations." Thus, the power to
levy an income or occupation tax is permitted only by the grace of the
state legislature, as were all powers with respect to local units of government prior to 1970.
Article VII, Section 6(g) provides for control by the state legislature
over the taxing power, but only by an extraordinary majority:
The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of three-fifths
of the members elected to each house may deny or limit the power
to tax and any other power or function of a home rule unit not
exercised or performed by the State other than a power or function specified in subsection (1) of this section.
Arguing for the three-fifths requirement relative to state control Delegate Philip J. Carey, Vice-chairman of the Local Government Committee,
stated during the debates that "home rule has not been effective in any
state of the fifty states; and we will be the first state to have successful home rule if we require the extraordinary majority.""3 Delegate
Carey referred to the usual provision in other state constitutions establishing home rule that all powers of the home rule units be subject
to limitation by the state legislature. One writer notes that even where
local governments are given home rule they are often faced with severe restrictions on imposition of new taxes. 4 However, by requiring
an extraordinary majority of each house to curb taxing power, the balance of power regarding taxation in Illinois was to be weighted strongly
in favor of the home rule unit.
Article VII, Section 6 (h) allows the state legislature by a simple ma32.

7

PROCEEDINGS

1627-28.

33. 4 PROCEEDINGS 3089.
34. Sperling, Municipal Income Taxation and Home Rule, 1 URB. LAw. 281, 281
(1969).
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jority to declare its own exercise of some home rule unit functions or
powers exclusive, thereby denying the exercise of such functions or
powers to home rule units. However, the power to tax is not subject
to such limitation. This section states as follows:
The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule
unit other than a taxing power or a power or function of subsection
(1) of this section.
Section 6(i) of Article VII provides for concurrent exercise of power
by the state and home rule units:
Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the
State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that
the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive.
Taking Sections 6(h) and 6(i) together, the taxing power of a home
rule unit cannot be denied by state occupation of the field. Adding the
effect of Section 6(g), no limits may be placed on the general taxing
power (other than on income or occupations) or on the special taxing power granted by Section 6 (1).
To round out the picture, Section 6(1) provides for special assessments and for additional taxes for limited areas within a home rule
unit according to law which are provided special services. Such taxing powers may not be limited or denied by the General Assembly.
In summary, the state cannot preempt an area of taxation solely by
levying its own tax, nor by doing so and declaring by a simple majority that such exercise is exclusive. The only method by which the state
legislature may limit or deny the right of a home rule unit to levy a tax
other than an income tax or an occupational tax is to pass specific
legislation by a three-fifths majority of each house so limiting or denying a taxing power.
The only other subsection of the home rule section of the Local Government Article which is relevant to this discussion of the case of City
of Evanston is Section 6(c) which provides as follows: "If a home
rule county ordinance conflicts with an ordinance of a municipality,
the municipal ordinance shall prevail within its jurisdiction." The Local Government Committee in its report suggested that in some cases
municipalities might not object to the exercise of a function within their
boundaries. The report goes on to say,
In other cases however, city officials may object to the assertion of
county authority within municipal boundaries, and there may
486
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be differences or actual conflicts
and inconsistencies between
35
municipal and county legislation.
The Committee chose to prefer munipalities over counties in the case of
conflict since it considered municipalities presently the most important
general purpose local unit of government. 36 However, powers granted
the county by state statute would continue to prevail over municipal authority.
THE Evanston CASE

The main issue presented in the City of Evanston case was
"whether a home-rule county tax may be imposed upon the sales of
motor vehicles within the corporate limits of a municipality when
that municipality has adopted an ordinance imposing a substantially
identical tax." 7 More broadly stated, the question was whether a
municipal taxing ordinance preempts a similar tax ordinance enacted
by the home rule county within which the municipality is located. The
application of Article VII, Section 6 (c) to the taxing power was to be decided.
The facts were that the Cook County Board of Commissioners, pursuant to the home rule status of Cook County (the only county to
qualify for the automatic grant of home rule powers), enacted an
ordinance levying a tax on the retail sale of motor vehicles effective
January 1, 1972. Subsequently, the City of Evanston adopted an ordinance taxing the retail sales of motor vehicles using the same schedule
of taxes as the Cook County ordinance. The Evanston ordinance included a passage which attempted to deny the county the right to levy
a similar tax within muncipal boundaries:
Section 25-59. The tax herein imposed is in addition to all other
taxes imposed by the Government of the United States or the State of
Illinois. No county or other unit of local government may impose a tax on the retail sale of new motor vehicles within the City
of Evanston, and any ordinance of the County of Cook or other unit
of local government, heretofore or hereafter adopted, which is
construed to impose a tax on the retail sale of new motor vehicles
in the City of Evanston, shall be in conflict with this ordinance
within the meaning of §6(c) of Article 7 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. This ordinance shall prevail within the jurisdiction of the City of Evanston upon its effective date and any conflicting ordinances of the County of Cook or other unit of local gov35.

36.
37.

7 PROCEEDINGS 1647.

7

PROCEEDINGS

1648-49.

City of Evanston, 53 111. 2d at 315, 291 N.E.2d at 824.
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eminent, which may be in effect on 88that date or hereafter enacted
shall not be effective within the City.
In February 1972, Arlington Heights, Oak Park, Niles and Berwyn
enacted similar ordinances, followed by Des Plaines in March. Evanston, Arlington Heights and Oak Park filed a suit for declaratory judgment and injunction against Cook County in February seeking relief
based on a conflict of their municipal ordinances with the county ordinance. A temporary injunction was granted and funds collected by
Cook County pursuant to its ordinance within the boundaries of the
plaintiffs were placed in a separate account subject to a final adjudication of the controversy. The City of Des Plaines, the Village of Niles
and the City of Berwyn were subsequently permitted to intervene as
additional parties plaintiff and the temporary injunction was made
applicable to funds collected within their boundaries.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted in April
1972. The Circuit Court of Cook County held that Article VII, Section
6(c) did not apply to tax ordinances and that there was no conflict
between the Cook County ordinance and the similar ordinances of
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Appellate Court
of Illinois, but by motion of plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 302(b) of
the Supreme Court of Illinois, the case was transferred to the supreme
court. The high court affirmed the lower court decision in November
1972. 39
The majority opinion written by Justice Ryan noted that all parties
to the suit were home rule units and had the authority under Article
VH, Section 6(a) of the 1970 Illinois constitution to levy a tax on
the sale of new motor vehicles within their boundaries since the General Assembly had not enacted any restraining legislation regarding such
a tax under the three-fifths provision, Section 6 (g) of Article VII.
Although the wording of the municipal ordinances attempted to establish a conflict between the municipal tax and the county tax, the
municipalities' labeling of the county ordinance as conflicting did not
make it so. The court omitted discussion of the wording of conflict,
so inconsequential it deemed the words to be.
The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the levy of identical
taxes by both a home rule county and a municipality fitted the constitutional concept of conflict. For the meaning of the word conflict,
38.

EVANSTON, ILL., ORDINANCE

6072 (January 31, 1972) (Ordinance to Provide for

a Tax on the Retail Sale of New Motor Vehicles).

39.

City of Evanston, 53 Ill. 2d at 319, 291 N.E.2d at 827.
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plaintiffs had resorted to the concept of preemption which relied for
its application on the field of taxation's concept of double taxation. Plaintiffs had urged that double taxation is never to be presumed to be the intent of the legislature (assuming that the drafters
of the constitution have the role of the legislators) and that in order
for that effect to be found by the court it must be clear that the legislature intended it.
The cases mentioned by the court as holding against double taxation involved two nonproperty tax assessments by the same government. In People ex rel. Lindheimer v. Schweitzer,4" a tax was levied in
1932 to pay an original indebtedness and another was levied in 1935 to
pay a second series of refunding bonds for the same debt. Since there
was specific separate authority for each tax and each was imposed alike
on all property in the district and imposed in a different taxing period, both taxes were upheld. The two taxes thus did not constitute
double taxation. In N.Y. Central R.R. v. Stevenson,4 the plaintiff
was taxed under the Incorporation Fee Act and under the Public Utilities
Act at the time of incorporation. Both taxes were paid to the State,
both were measured by the amount of stock authorized to be issued, and
both were exacted for the privilege of exercising a corporate franchise. The presumption against double taxation led to a holding that
the second act superseded repugnant provisions of the first, and only
one tax was due.
The City of Evanston decision cited five cases in which the Supreme
Court of Illinois had found that taxation of property by two different
governmental units for a similar purpose was dual taxation but not
double taxation. People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Caliendo4 2 involved taxation of real property by the City of Chicago and by an urban transportation district for transportation purposes. The decision stated, "the
simple fact that both the city of Chicago and the District may tax the
same property does not violate the uniformity requirement. ''43 Kucharski v. White4 4 involved a similar case in which a municipality and
a special district were both taxing the same real property for library
purposes. Again the court held that different public authorities may
tax within parts of the same territory. People ex rel. Witte v. Franklin"I and Board of Highway Comm. v. City of Bloomington," cited by
40. 369 I11.
355, 16 N.E.2d 897 (1938).
41. 277 I11.
474, 115 N.E. 633 (1917).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

50 111. 2d 72, 277 N.E.2d 319 (1971).
Id. at 84, 277 N.E.2d at 326.
42 Ill.
2d 335, 247 N.E.2d 428 (1969).
352 I11.
528, 186 N.E. 137 (1933).
253 Il1.
164, 97 N.E.280 (1912).
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the court, dealt with taxation by two governmental bodies for pauper
relief and roads and bridges, respectively. Their holdings were consistent with the two above cases, as was People ex rel. Darnell v.
Woodward 7 which dealt with taxation for secondary education.
The double taxation concept evidently was derived from the constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation on real property found in
both the 1870 and 1970 Illinois constitutions4 8 and from the companion requirement of uniformity of assessment of subjects and objects of
nonproperty taxes or fees found in both constitutions.49 Uniformity
regarding property was interpreted to mean that a certain section of
real estate in a taxing district could not be taxed twice for the same
purpose in the same year without taxing the entire area a second time.5"
There are two distinctions which might be made between the cases
mentioned by the court as invalidating one tax on the basis of double
taxation and the cases upholding taxation by two units of government. The first distinction is that cited by the plaintiff-municipalities-the difference between nonproperty taxation and property taxation. The second distinction is the one approved by the court-the
difference between taxation of a source by one taxing unit twice as
opposed to taxation by two overlapping taxation units. The first distinction does not appear to be the telling one since the uniformity principle of the constitution applies to both nonproperty taxation and
property taxation. Thus, the second distinction takes on more significance, with taxation by one government twice for the same purpose
being held in disfavor as double taxation and simultaneous taxation
by overlapping units (as in the facts of the City of Evanston case)
being found to be unobjectionable dual taxation.
The double taxation argument of the plaintiffs in the City of Evanston case involving interpretation of the conflict clause is an attempt
to show a preference for the municipalities' taxes by showing a state policy against overlapping exercise of taxing authority. However, the
1970 Illinois constitution accepts the concept of overlapping exercise
of power regarding the state and local units in Section 6(i) of the Local Government Article.
The Illinois constitution does away with the idea that concurrent
exercise results in preemption-an interpretation used in the home rule
47. 285 Il1. 165, 120 N.E. 496 (1918).
48. ILL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 9 & 10 (1870) and ILL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 4 (1970).
49. ILL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2, 9 & 10 (1870) and ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1970).
50. People ex rel. Toman v. Advance Heating Co., 376 Ill. 158, 163, 33 N.E.2d
206, 209 (1941).
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area by other states5' but pointedly avoided by the drafters of the 1970
Illinois constitution. Several sections of the Illinois constitution provide for concurrent exercise of powers by the state and by home rule
units,"2 for limitation of home rule powers by action of the state legislature,"' and for limitation of concurrent exercise of powers by a
home rule county and a municipality in situations where the ordinances of the units "conflict." 5 4 Therefore, the notion that concurrent
exercise of power results in preemption of power by the favored unit as
applied in courts of other states in the absence of any specific provisions
for concurrent powers, such as are found in the Illinois constitution,
is inapplicable to the Illinois experience.
The court in this case turned to the debates of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention for enlightenment as to the meaning of the term
"conflicts" as used in Section 6(c). The court noted that throughout
the discussion of Section 6(c) the area of taxation was not mentioned
as an area of potential conflict.5" The court cited the Report of the
Committee as recognizing "the problem of legislating in the same field
by both a municipality and a home-rule county not as a question
of preemption of authority but as a matter of resolving conflicts in
56
ordinances.
One commentator has declared that comments of the Chairman of
the Local Government Committee during the debates make it clear that
"conflicts" would include both contraditions between home rule county
ordinances and municipal ordinances and occupation of the field by the
municipality and would apply to such areas as zoning, licensing and taxation.5 7
The comments of Delegate John C. Parkhurst, Chairman of the
Committee, during the convention debates did include use of the term
preemption with reference to the effect that legislation by a municipality would have on legislation in the same field by a home rule
51. See generally Glander and Dewey, Municipal Taxation: A Study of the Preemption Doctrine, 1948 OHIO ST. L.J. 72; 4 PROCEEDINGS 3090 (Delegate Philip Carey
citing the experience of Ohio, Texas and California); 4 PROCEEDINGS 3331 (Delegate
Thomas C. Kelleghan citing the Baltimore, Md. experience regarding minimum wage
standards); Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
52. ILL. CoNsT. art. VII, § 6(i) (1970); see p. 486, supra.
53. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §§ 6(e)(2), 6(g), 6(h) (1970); see pp. 485-86, supra.
54. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(c) (1970).
55. City of Evanston, 53 Ill. 2d at 317, 291 N.E.2d at 826.
56. Id. (citing 7 PROCEEDINGS 1591, 1646-50).
57. Baum (Counsel of the Committee on Local Government, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention), A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part 11): Legislative
Control, Transition Problems, and Intergovernmental Conflict, 1972 ILL. L.F. 559, 584
(referring to the remarks of Delegate John C. Parkhurst at 4 PROCEEDINGS 3026, 3049,
and 3123).
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county. Delegate Parkhurst did mention the taxing power as one of
58
It
the home rule powers which might be subject to preemption.
is not clear that he had considered the case of dual taxation, specifically, with reference to conflict since taxation was not among the
graphic examples used with reference to ousting the county's authority.5 9
Since these comments of Delegate Parkhurst were impromptu oral
ones made in response to requests for explanation of Section 6(c) of
Article VII, they may justifiably be given less weight than the written
annotation to the section in the Report of the Committee60 and the common meaning of the word "conflicts" found in the constitutional
language.
Other delegates mentioned pollution control 6' and business hours
for taverns 2 as possible areas of conflict. The fields of legislation
mentioned by the delegates during the debates generally were ones in
which there are likely to be inconsistencies: a requirement by the county that taverns close at midnight would be inconsistent with a municipal ordinance providing that taverns close at 2:00 a.m.; a municipal
zoning regulation providing that a particular block be restricted to
residential use only would be inconsistent with a county regulation permitting heavy industrial use in that block. The court implied that taxation is a field apart from these in its operation.
58. "Section 3.3 [now art. VII, § 6(c)] has to do with the conflict situation at the
local level. We thought about this a long time, . . . and we have no controversy on
it, as far as I know. The provision simply says, in so many words, that when a county
exercises home rule powers countywide, the county may have its power usurped or preempted in a city within that county, if the [city] exercises the power, also.
"In this context, you might think about zoning. Zoning power, of course, by statute
is given to counties, and the county can zone completely within the county and even
across municipal boundary lines, but if the city within the county adopts its own zoning ordinance, that pre-empts and the county can't zone within that city." 4 PROCEEDINGS 3026;
"If a home rule power is exercised by a county, it is intended . . . by [section]
3.3 that that power could be exercised countywide-countywide-the issuance of
bonds, the incurring of debt, the licensing, the taxing power could be countywide, not
just within the unincorporated area. . . . However, it is clearly stated in 3.3 that if
the county did that and some municipality wanted to pre-empt the county in the exercise of that particular power-let's assume a licensing power-the municipality could
do it and thus reassume the jurisdiction of that particular matter and oust the county."

4
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3049, (Emphasis supplied.);

Following a discussion of the licensing of Fuller Brush men in which Delegate Parkhurst stated that if a municipal ordinance set different standards from the county's
ordinance, the municipality's ordinance would prevail within the municipality, he went
on to summarize: "[w]hat [section 3.3] says is that the county can exercise home
rule powers countywide; but if a municipal ordinance, as provided by law, within that
county does the same thing, the municipal ordinance prevails." 4 PROCEEDINGS 3123.
59. See note 58, supra.
60. See p. 491, supra.
61. "Mhis [section] involves the conflict, if you will, or the question of what happens when you've got a city and a county ordinance in the same territory on the same
subject. . . . [W]e should not allow, for example, a weak county ordinance on air
or water pollution or on garbage dumps to completely emasculate a strong city ordinance
in this area." 4 PROCEEDINGS 3120 (Delegate Paul F. Elward).

62.

4 PROCEEDINGS 3124 (Delegate Donald D. Zeglis).
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The reason taxation is different is that the purpose is not to regulate an activity but to obtain income for the governmental unit. There
is nothing theoretically inconsistent about taxation of personal income
by both the federal government and the state government-in Illinois
they co-exist. The taxed individual pays twice, but the funds go to
two different governmental levels. A similar situation is presented in
this Illinois supreme court case: one source is taxed by two different
governmental units, both possessing the authority to so tax. Enforcement of the county tax ordinance need not render the municipal one
ineffective since revenue, not regulation is the goal.
The court reasoned that since revenue is such an essential ingredient in home rule effectiveness6 3 and counties had been included in
the grant of home rule powers in the hope of strengthening county government,6 4 home rule county revenue power should not be limited by
the decision of a municipality to enact similar taxing ordinances.
The complaint of the plaintiff-municipalities that Cook County could
dry up sources of revenue by imposing a burdensome tax on them
first was answered by the court with the suggestion that abuses be resolved by action of the General Assembly by a three-fifths vote of each
house to limit or deny a taxing power to a home rule unit.6" As the
court was not obliged to offer any solution, the one offered should
probably not be criticized too sharply; however, this solution to the drying-up revenue problem is somewhat unsatisfactory. If the General
Assembly were to enact legislation by the required three-fifths of each
house limiting the rate of taxation on a particular source of revenue,
there might be a problem regarding what share of that rate each
home rule unit taxing that source would be allowed or whether the
municipality by taxing at the full rate allowed would be able to create
a conflict within the meaning of Section 6 (c).
Other possible solutions to the problem are that the home rule units
use more creativity in selection of sources of revenue and develop coordination among units of local government in close proximity. The
cigarette tax imposed by the City of Chicago which was recently held to
be within the home rule powers" has not been copied by any of
the adjoining municipalities, nor has Cook County yet levied a tax on
63. City of Evanston, 53 IlL 2d at 318, 291 N.E.2d at 826 (citing Cohn, Municipal
Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional Home Rule, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 27

(1956)).
64.

City of Evanston, 53 Ill. 2d at 318, 291 N.E.2d at 826 (citing 7

1649 (Report of the Committee on Local Government)).
65. City of Evanston, 53 Il1. 2d at 319, 291 N.E.2d at 827.
66.

S. Bloom, Inc. v. Korshak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972).
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the sale or use of cigarettes. If all the neighboring municipalities did
enact such a tax, it would raise revenue for all the units and leave
few sources for tax-free cigarettes which now render the scheme ineffective.
The dissenting opinion17 relied upon quotations from the convention debates. The quotations discussed conflicts as regards regulatory
ordinances in terms of preemption in order to show that conflict in the
context of Section 6(c) could mean assertion of authority with regard
to the same subject by two overlapping units of government as well as
outright contradictions and inconsistencies between ordinances of the
overlapping units. As was pointed out above, however, Section 6(c)
is worded in terms of "conflicts" between a home rule county ordinance and an ordinance of a municipality, not in terms of overlapping
by a home rule county ordinance of a municipal ordinance. Although
preemption may be the natural result of the application of Section
6(c) to similar regulatory ordinances because such ordinances pertaining to the same subject tend to contradict one another, the same is
not necessarily true with regard to similar taxation ordinances.
The dissenting opinion points to the 1959 legislation providing that
counties be authorized to levy a retailer's occupation tax only within
unincorporated areas as an example of an attempt to avoid dual taxation (taxation by two overlapping taxing authorities) because municipalities were authorized to impose a similar tax. It concludes that
the purpose of Section 6 (c) was similarly to prevent dual taxation:
In our opinion one of the purposes of section 6(c) was to prevent
a home-rule county from putting municipalities to the choice of
foregoing necessary revenue on the one hand, or imposing an economic disadvantage upon businesses located within their borders
on the other. The recognition of authority in a home-rule county
to levy a tax of this kind upon transactions which take place in
the unincorporated areas of the county will fully meet the needs
of the county without adversely affecting
the power of home-rule
68
municipalities to raise necessary funds.
However, the home rule powers granted by the 1970 Illinois constitution to counties were not limited to the unincorporated areas as was
the authority to levy a retailer's occupation tax. Since dual taxation
had previously existed in the state without seeming to cause a conflict,6 9 it would seem logical that a change in the policy of permitting
67. Written by Justice Schaefer, representing the views of Chief Justice Underwood
and Justice Davis as well as himself.
68. City of Evanston, 53 Ill. 2d at 324, 291 N.E.2d at 829-30.
69. See pp. 489-90, supra.
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dual taxation would have been banned more specifically by Section
6 (c) if indeed that were a part of the purpose of the section.
CONCLUSION

The decision itself is so terse as to present little material for analysis. In deciding that Section 6 (c) of Article VII of the 1970 Illinois constitution does not apply to the imposition of identical taxes by a home
rule county and a home rule municipality, the court did not stress the
differences between the method of operation of regulatory ordinances
to which the section admittedly does apply and taxing ordinances: it
merely relied on the fact that there was no mention of taxing ordinances during discussion in the convention of the county-municipal
conflict section"0 and that dual taxation by different local governmental bodies has been accepted in Illinois. In its effort to be brief and
to the point the majority opinion also made no mention of the fact
that the word preemption was indeed used during floor debate 7 with
reference to the operation of Section 6(c), although largely in conjunction with contradictory licensing or zoning ordinances-perhaps
an unintentional use of the word preemption for conflict.
However brief the decision, the court did construe the word "conflicts" found in the constitution in its ordinary meaning, that is, showing incompatibility, irreconcilability or interference. It found taxaton of the same source of revenue-new motor vehicle sales-by
72
both municipality and home rule county to be compatible activities.
The fact that the plaintiffs' interpretation of conflict as including occupation of the field or preemption was not accepted by the court sets
Illinois apart from the states which use preemption as a method of determining the limits of power of home rule units.
The decision does permit Cook County and any other county which
may eventually qualify as a home rule unit to raise revenue without
the necessity of receiving permission from the state and without the
possibility of preemption by municipalities. With revenue powers relatively unrestricted, the county may be able to take on more responsibility for countywide problems.
Municipalities will be able to tax local sources of revenue but must
concern themselves as must home rule counties with the total revenue burden imposed by various units on those sources.
If the decision had been that Section 6(c) did apply to the con70.
71.
72.

See pp. 491-92 and note 58, supra.
See note 58, supra.
City of Evanston, 53 I11.2d at 318-19, 291 N.E.2d at 826.
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current exercise of the taxation power and municipalities could displace the county with respect to any revenue source, there would have
been the potential for limiting the county to dependency upon the
unincorporated areas and non-home rule municipalities (which do
not have the authority to enact a taxing ordinance without permission
from the state) for revenue. The ability of the county to function
within the municipal areas would probably have decreased, for without sufficient funds countywide programs would have to be more
limited. Moreover, there might have been a tendency to create even
more special districts to handle problems which span municipal boundaries.
In order for the county to be a viable unit of local government and
not simply an arm of the state, it must have revenue powers. The decision to construe home rule county revenue powers broadly is a victory for those who hope that the county government can eventually
take the place of some of the special districts and by coordination bring
more efficient government to metropolitan areas.
The court is not likely to go to the extreme of letting all home rule
counties do as they please, however. In another recent decision the
Illinois supreme court held that Cook County did not have the authority
to collect real estate taxes quarterly rather than biannually as provided by state law. 73 Home rule municipalities are also finding a few
rocks in their path, as in the recent case deciding that legislation by the
General Assembly was necessary before a home rule unit could impose
additional taxes upon an area within its boundaries for the provision
of special services to the area.74
The holding of the City of Evanston case is narrowly drawn to apply to the case of taxation of the same transaction in absence of state
restriction by a home rule county and by home rule municipalities.
The holding can be extended to include non-home rule municipalities
having the authority to tax the transaction. However, the court did
not hold that Section 6(c) is totally inapplicable to the dual exercise
of taxation authority. Therefore, as hinted earlier,7 action by the
General Assembly to limit the total rate of taxation on a particular
transaction could produce an arguable case of conflict between a municipal tax equal to the allowable rate and a home rule county tax on
the same transaction.
SALLY WARNER DAWSON
73. Bridgman v. Korzen, - Ill. 2d -, - N.E.2d - (1972).
74. Oak Park Federal Savings and Loan v. Village of Oak Park, No. 45171 (Ill.,
January, 1973).
75. See p. 493, supra.
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